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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NAMED PARTIES
Appellee Environmental Friends, Inc. (EF) is a special in-
terest group of 75,000 members of which only four (4) live in
or near the city of Venice. (R. 4). EF filed affidavits from six
members. (R. 4). Bernard Brown of Virginia and Cathy Co-
norado of Maryland filed affidavits stating vague plans to
eventually visit Venice but they have never made efforts to
solidify these plans. (R. 4). David and Dorothy Downs filed
affidavits stating they are American citizens renting an apart-
ment four (4) miles from the missile site. (R. 4). On average
they hike once a month in the immediate vicinity of the Ven-
ice missile site. (R. 4). Equalia Emelia of Venice, and Franco
Francisco of Rome, also filed affidavits. (R. 4). Emelia is a
teacher in a local public school in Venice, who owns her own
home about half a mile from the Venice site. (R. 4). Francisco,
an Italian government worker, visits Venice on holiday about
once a year and has stayed three times in a motel adjacent to
the Venice missile site. (R. 4).
Appellee Defense Contractors Association (DCA), head-
quartered in Arlington County, Virginia, has a membership of
approximately 3000 defense contractors, which account for
nearly seventy percent (70%) of the Defense Department's
contracting budget. (R. 5). No DCA member has employees
who live or work near the Venice base. DCA asserts that al-
though conventional technologies are more expensive than Bi-
ocore, well proven for effectiveness and safety.
DCA filed affidavits from two members, Grant General
Services, Inc., and Hisson EarthClean, Inc. (R. 5). Both stated
that they are capable of bidding on and performing a contract
to use conventional technology'at the Venice missile site, but
since Biocore is owned by the United States, no private con-
tractor can apply Biocore. (R. 5). Grant General Services is a
large, long-established contractor which provides a wide range
of services to the Defense Department, including soil purifica-
tion. (R. 5). Hisson EarthClean, is a relatively new company,
specializing nearly exclusively in cleaning hazardous waste
from contaminated military sites. (R. 5).
[Vol. 9
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/6
BEST APPELLANT BRIEF
II. RELEVANT EVENTS
The facts are not in dispute. The US Army plans to leave
its base in Venice, Italy except for a skeleton staff to care for
the buildings and prevent vandalism, because the site is no
longer needed even for the limited function as a storage site.
(R. 2). Eventually, the Army plans to turn control of this base,
and other similar bases located throughout Italy over to the
Italian government. (R. 2). However, discussions between the
two governments on how to accomplish this goal are ongoing.
(R. 2)
A 1989 Army investigation of environmental conditions at
the Venice missile site revealed high levels of toxic missile fuel
contamination in the topsoil, generally down to a level of
about 24 inches from the surface. (R. 3). In order to clean the
contaminated soil, the Army plans to apply Biocore, a strain
of genetically engineered microorganisms developed by Army
laboratories. (R. 3). Army tests on Biocore suggest that the
microorganisms will eat the contaminant and die for lack of
food posing no further threat to the environment. (R. 3).
The Army plans for its employees to apply the Biocore
and to conduct various tests on the soil in order to assess the
effects of Biocore. (R. 3). Internal Army practice does not con-
sider a decision to act "final" until it issue actual travel orders
and it has not issued any travel orders to any personnel in-
volved in the base clean-up. (R. 5-6).
The preceding information was reflected in a "Summary
Environmental Analysis of the Venice, Italy, Missile Site
Clean-up," which the Army completed in March 1990, in com-
pliance with Executive Order 12114. (R. 3) As this was not a
rulemaking procedure, nor a final agency action, the Army did
not circulate the document for public comment. The Sum-
mary came to light at a September 1990 congressional hear-
ing, when the Army announced its intent to use Biocore at the
Venice missile site. (R. 4). The army also prepared an envi-
ronmental assessment and "finding of no significant impact"
on Biocore's laboratory development.
1992]
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III. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In October and November 1990, respectively, EF and
DCA filed lawsuits in the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia alleging the Army failed to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). (R. 4). The
United States motioned for summary judgment under Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that neither
EF no DCA had standing to challenge the clean-up plans, and
that NEPA cannot be applied outside of the United States. In
an opinion ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the
District Court held: (1) EF and DCA do have standing to
challenge the Army's decisions (R. 6), and (2) that NEPA
does apply outside the United States. (R. 6). A timely appeal
was filed by the United States to challenge the district court's
decision.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In order to obtain judicial review of any government deci-
sion an appellee must meet standing requirements, under the
U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act. The
purpose of standing is to assure that only those parties with a
direct interest in the outcome of the controversy are permit-
ted to resolve their dispute in the court. Because EF and DCA
have failed to demonstrate the requirements necessary to
challenge the agency action, this court should grant Appel-
lant's motion for summary judgment.
First, both EF and DCA have failed to show an injury in
fact which is redressable by the remedy sought. The affidavits
submitted by EF are insufficient to show a distinct injury nec-
essary for standing. Mere allegations that its members may
come in the vicinity of the area is not enough to show injury
in fact. Hisson EarthClean's failure to procure a contract to
clean up the missile site cannot be an injury in fact because
there is no evidence that they would have received the con-
tract "but for" the Army's action.
Second, neither EF nor DCA can show that the remedy
which they seek will redress their alleged injuries. Even if the
Army was required to prepare an EIS, there is no guarantee
[Vol. 9
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that this additional procedure will stop the Army from using
Biocore. Furthermore, the Army's finding of "no significant
impact will weigh heavily on their discretionary decision of
whether to apply Biocore.
APA Section 704 allows standing only on those issue
which are ripe for review. Under Army regulations, a decision
is not final until actual orders are issued. The APA also re-
quires that the interests sought to be protected must fall
within the statutory zone of interest. NEPA was not enacted
to protect economic interests therefore DCA does not have
standing, and although EF does fall within NEPA's zone of
interest, the affidavits they submitted fail to show they have
been adversely affected of aggrieved.
Appellant further contends that NEPA does not apply to
defense department actions outside the United States. Absent
an express indication of intent by Congress, there is a pre-
sumption that legislation is to apply only within the territory
of the United States. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284
(1949). The specific language of the statute as well as. the leg-
islative history clearly indicate that Congress did not intend
for NEPA to apply outside the U.S.
Finally, because the decision of the Army to use Biocore
is one that is committed to agency discretion, it is unreview-
able by the courts. Generally, an agency's construction of the
laws it administers is viewed with considerable deference, and
the court will not be permitted to substitute its interpretation
as long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). As it is rea-
sonable for the Army to interpret NEPA as not requiring it to
prepare an EIS because of the extraterritorial restriction, this
decision may not be second-guessed by the court.
ARGUMENT
I. THE AFFIDAVITS FILED BY ENVIRONMENTAL
FRIENDS, INC. AND THE DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION ARE INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE DEFENSE DE-
19921
11
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
PARTMENT'S CLEANUP PLAN FOR THE MISSILE
SITE.
Under the standard of review set forth in Rule 56(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a party moving for sum-
mary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if
the allegations contained in the pleadings, discovery docu-
ments and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact." The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates
the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for dis-
covery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element es-
sential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). Further, "these standards are fully applicable
when a defendant moves for summary judgment in a suit
brought under Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to show
that he is adversely affected of aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute." Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990). Therefore,
EF and DCA have the burden of proving that their organiza-
tions have standing before the court may address their com-
plaints. Because neither party has met their burden, instead
alleging only bare allegations of injury, the district court im-
properly granted them standing.
One of the purposes of the standing requirement is to as-
sure that only those persons with a direct stake in the out-
come of a dispute are permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to resolve it. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
Standing also maintains the "crucial and inseparable" ele-
ment of the separation of powers among the branches of gov-
ernment by providing a limit on the involvement of the courts
in legislative and executive actions. Warth v. Seldin, 422, U.S.
490, 498 (1975) (See also, Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk
U.L. Rev. 881 (1983)).
The Supreme Court has broken down standing limita-
tions into "constitutional" and "prudential" categories. Pru-
[Vol. 9
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dential categories are judicial determinations of what persons
Congress intended to be plaintiffs in cases where the grant of
standing is not clear on the face of the applicable statute. Val-
ley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). (See Also
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 252
(1988-89).
Because NEPA does not allow citizen suits, any attempt
to challenge the statute must be obtained through the re-
quirements of the APA. In the instant case, neither EF nor
DCA were able to satisfy the requirements necessary to be-
stow standing. As a result, neither should be permitted to
have their complaint address in this court.
A. Neither EF nor DCA have standing under the Con-
stitution to challenge the Defense Department's de-
cision to use Biocore at the Venice missile site.
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of all federal court to "cases and controversies,"
requiring federal courts to deal only with real and substantial
disputes that affect the legal rights and obligations of parties
having adverse interests, and that allow specific relief through
a conclusive judicial decree. In order to demonstrate standing
for purposes of Article III, a plaintiff must show (1) that he
suffered an injury in fact (2) that this injury was caused or is
likely to be caused by the conduct of the defendant, and (3)
that the injury is fairly redressable by the remedy sought.
Valley Forge Christian College at 472.
1. EF And DCA failed to demonstrate that they
suffered an injury in fact.
The key case in the area of injury in fact is Association of
Data Processing Services Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970), which abandoned the former legal interest test in
favor of an injury in fact requirement. The Court in Data
Processing emphasized that this injury in fact requirement is
relatively lenient; it may include a wide variety of economic,
aesthetic environmental and other harms. (See also Sierra
1992]
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Club v. Morton infra stating that "particular environmental
interests. . .shared by the many rather than the few does not
make them less deserving of legal protection through the judi-
cial process"). The consequence is that beneficiaries of gov-
ernment regulations, not merely those trying to fend off gov-
ernment action could have standing to sue. But this certainly
does not mean there is or should be a universal grant of
standing, and recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court indicate more restrictive requirements must be met to
establish standing in NEPA cases. Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation at 3187 (requiring specific facts which would raise
genuine issues of material fact in order to oppose a motion for
summary judgment).
The case at bar is apposite to Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, (1972) in which standing was denied on injury in
fact grounds. Sierra Club involved an effort by an environ-
mental special interest group to challenge construction of a
recreation area in a national forest. The Sierra Club felt the
construction would have violated federal law. The Court de-
nied standing saying that the fact that an aesthetic, conserva-
tional or recreational harm would be sufficient did not mean
that it would abandon the requirement that the party seeking
review must have suffered an injury. In the present case EF
has failed to show that it has or may suffer an injury in fact.
The high water mark for finding injury in fact came
under United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), in which
the court held that environmental groups could challenge the
Interstate Commerce Commission's failure to suspend a
surcharge on railroad freight rates as unlawful under the ICC
Act. The plaintiffs claimed that their members "used the for-
ests, streams, mountains, and other resources in the Washing-
ton metropolitan area for camping, hiking, fishing, and sight-
seeing. The court in SCRAP found:
the attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury of
which the plaintiffs complained-a general rate increase
would allegedly cause increased use of nonrecyclable com-
modities as compared to recyclable goods, thus resulting
[Vol. 9
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in the need to use more natural resources to produce such
goods, some of which resources might be taken from the
Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might
be discarded in national parks in the Washington area.
But as the Honorable Justice Scalia pointed out in his
majority opinion of Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
the SCRAP opinion. . .has never since been emulated by this
Court, and is of no relevance since it involved a Rule 12 (b)
motion to dismiss on the pleadings as opposed to the case at
bar which involves a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
The Rule 12(b) motion, unlike summary judgment motion,
presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts
that are necessary to support the claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957).
In the case at bar, EF has failed to set forth specific facts
needed to procure standing. EF's affidavit from its president,
Alice Anderson, stating that its goals are respect for the envi-
ronment and acknowledgment of how little we understand its
complexities, is not specific enough to confer standing on the
organization because long standing concern with environmen-
tal matters is not sufficient to establish standing. Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972). Likewise, EF's six other
affidavits from club members are insufficient to show injury in
fact. David and Dorothy Downs filed affidavits which state
that they are American -citizens renting an apartment four (4)
miles from the missile site where they are free- lance photog-
raphers. (R. 4). They state that on average once a month they
hike in the "immediate vicinity" of the Venice missile site and
can often take marketable photographs. (R. 4). While these
affidavits may adequately allege adverse effect or aggrieve-
ment they fail to demonstrate that the interests of the indi-
viduals were actually affected by the specific agency action
challenged. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation the
court held that a claim that a person uses lands "in the vicin-
ity" fails to show specific facts supporting the affiants' allega-
tions. Id. at 3188. Because the Army base is completely en-
closed and barred from public access, it would be impossible
for a citizen to allege anything more specific than merely "in
1992]
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the vicinity."
Similarly, DCA's affidavits failed to allege facts sufficient
for organizational standing. DCA's statement of explanation
for its mission lists "a safe and healthy environment as one of
eight "social policies benefitted by private partnership." (R.
5). Other policies include, for example, striving for racial and
sexual equality, assuring a safe workplace, and providing af-
fordable care for dependents. (R. 5). Again, a mere interest in
the environment will not be adequate to obtain standing. Si-
erra Club v. Morton at 739. Clearly, DCA's concern with the
environment is secondary to the relevant portion of DCA's
mission statement that "in the long run, the Nation's best de-
fense is a partnership of the public and private sectors, which
results in sustainable policies of all kinds - tactical, financial,
social and logistical - in all aspects of defense, from weapons
development to facility decommissioning." (R. 5). DCA is a
business organization, with one thing in mind - profits. It is
far from an environmental organization hoping to improve the
quality of the environment. Therefore this court should find
that neither DCA not its members have standing to bring suit.
2. EF and DCA failed to show that the injury is
redressable by the remedy sought.
Finally, the case and controversy requirement of the Con-
stitution demands that the injury complained of be
redressable by the remedy sought. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984). Assuming arguendo that both EF and DCA
have fulfilled the injury in fact requirement, a ruling in their
favor will not remedy the situation. The Army has already
conducted an investigation pursuant to Executive Order 12114
which revealed no significant environmental impact. (R. 3-4).
By ruling for Respondents this court would simply obligate
the Department of Defense to produce an environmental im-
pact statement which will only serve to duplicate the Army's
findings. It makes little sense to waste taxpayers money on
duplicate procedures that have value only for procedural sake.
Further, once an EIS is prepared, there is nothing that
will require the Army to follow the findings of the EIS. NEPA
[Vol. 9
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is a procedural statute, not a substantive statute. As long as
the procedures are followed there is nothing guaranteeing that
DCA or EF will receive the remedy for which they are looking.
Therefore this court should find that neither DCA nor EF
have standing under the mandates of the U.S. Constitution.
B. Neither EF nor DCA have statutory standing to
challenge the decision to use Biocore.
Congress may eliminate the prudential requirement
under the Constitution altogether and confer standing by
statute. The most significant statutory grant of standing for
purposes of environmental law is the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts
Environmental Standing to Constrain the Courts 20 Envtl. L.
10557 (1990). Chapter 7 of the APA sets forth the procedure
for judicial review of an agency action. First, under section
702, plaintiffs must allege that they are adversely affect or ag-
grieved by agency action and that their alleged injury falls
within the "zone of interest" sought to be protected by the
statute at issue. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 871
F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1989).
1. The Army's decision to use Biocore is not a final
order as required under APA Section 704.
Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides
that agency actions reviewable by statute and final agency ac-
tion for which there is no other adequate remedy can be judi-
cially reviewed. It states:
agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, proce-
dural or intermediate agency action ruling not directly re-
viewable is subject to review on the review of the final
agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by
statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the pur-
poses of this section whether or not there has been
presented or determined an application for a declaratory
order, for any form of reconsideration, or unless the
19921
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agency otherwise requires by rule and provided that the
action meanwhile in inoperative, for an appeal to superior
agency authority.
Internal Army practice is not to consider a decision final
until orders have been issued for employees to embark on
travel, usually anywhere from 2 days to 30 days before travel
actually takes place. While the Army employees designated to
apply Biocore have been told orally by supervisors to expect
to travel to Italy for this purpose during the summer of 1992,
the fact remains that no travel orders have been issued.
In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232
(1980) the FTC issued a complaint against Oil Co. because the
FTC "had reason to believe" that the statute had been vio-
lated. The Court refused to review the action based on the
final order rule of APA section 704. They indicated that inter-
vention before a final decision was made would deny the
agency a chance to correct its own mistake and apply its ex-
pertise. It would lead to inefficient and perhaps unnecessary
piecemeal review and would delay ultimate resolution of the
controversy.
Further, in a concept closely related to finality, a plaintiff
will be denied judicial review unless the case is "ripe" for re-
view. Typically, ripeness issues involve an administrative pol-
icy that has not yet been specifically applied to the plaintiff,
such as the case at bar. Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that the
new policy will cause them severe harm even before it is spe-
cifically applied to the plaintiff.
The ripeness doctrine is designed to avoid litigating in
the abstract- i.e. before the administrative policy has been
applied in a concrete way to the plaintiff. They plaintiff may
never actually be harmed; in which case costly judicial review
can be avoided.
The court must consider two factor in determining
whether an administrative decision is ripe for review: (1) the
fitness of the issues for immediate review and (2) the hardship
to the parties that would result if the court withheld review.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
In weighing the fitness of these issues for review the court
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must inquire whether the questions presented are of law
rather than fact or discretion. Also, it must consider whether
either the reviewing court or the agency would benefit from
postponement of review until the agency action or policy has
assumed a final or more concrete form. In particular, it is im-
portant that the agency action be final. (See discussion
supra.) The court also weighs the extent to which the action is
formal or informal. Early authority suggested that informal
actions, such as the decision to use Biocore without first con-
ducting an EIS, were never ripe for review in advance of ac-
tual application. International Longshoreman's Union v.
Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954). While a informal rule, such as the
case at bar, will now be more likely to be reviewed, the plain-
tiffs still must show hardship from delay of review.
Clearly, EF and DCA cannot demonstrate hardship from
a deferral of judicial review. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gard-
ner an FDA rule required the brand name of drug labels to be
accompanied every time it was used by the generic or common
name of the chemical, and if a manufacturer failed to comply
with the regulation, the Attorney General could confiscate its
products and seek criminal penalties. The Court found that
the hardship was that the plaintiffs were in a dilemma: either
comply with the rule (which meant destroying labels and
printing new ones, which was costly) or defy it (which entailed
a risk of confiscation of their products as misbranded, of dam-
ages to goodwill, and even of criminal sanctions, and subse-
quently found the issue ripe for review. Id. Also in Columbia
Broadcasting Co. v. United States the Court held ripe FCC
rules banning certain contracts between licensees and net-
works. The court found that further delay would destroy the
networks business. 316 U.S. 407 (1942). As compared with
these cases, neither DCA nor EF can show hardship needed
for the Court to find the matter ripe for review. There is no
possibility that DCA or one of its members will go out of busi-
ness if the action is not reviewed immediately. EF and DCA
will have to wait until the issue becomes final and ripe. before
the courts should make a decision on the complaint.
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2. The interests sought to be protected must fall
within the zone of interest of the statute.
In order to be adversely affected or aggrieved within the
meaning of a statute, the plaintiff must establish that the in-
jury he complains of falls within the zone of interest sought to
be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms
the legal basis for his complaint. See Clarke v. Securities In-
dustry Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 396-397 (1987).
The failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provi-
sion requiring "on the record" hearings would assuredly have
an adverse effect upon the company that has the contract to
record and transcribe the agency's proceedings; but since the
provision was obviously enacted to protect the interest of the
parties to the proceedings and not those of the reporters, that
company would not be adversely affected with the "meaning
of the statute." Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation at
3186.
DCA's purpose is to further the economic interests of its
members not to serve as a protector of foreign environments.
(For a full discussion of DCA's purpose see supra.)
NEPA was not enacted to protect economic interests
therefore DCA does not have standing, and although the
members of EF may fall within NEPA's zone of interest, the
affidavits they submitted fail to show they have been ad-
versely affected of aggrieved.
3. EF and DCA failed to prove they have been ad-
versely affected or aggrieved within the meaning
the APA.
The requirement that the plaintiff be "adversely affected
or aggrieved" is equivalent to the constitutional "injury in
fact" requirement. Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). It is uncontested
that the allegedly affected interests set forth in EF's affida-
vits-"recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment"-are suffi-
ciently related to the purposes of respondents association that
respondent meets the requirements of Section 702 of the APA
if any of its members meet these requirements. Hunt v.
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Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n 432 U.S. 333
(1977). However, the affiants in the case at bar do not show
sufficient evidence that they are adversely affected or ag-
grieved. One EF member lives near the missile site, two even-
tually hope to vacation somewhere in the city of Venice, and
two take photographs in the vicinity of the site. This simply is
not sufficient to grant standing to these individuals of EF.
Under the standard set forth for summary judgment in Lujan,
the court should find that EF and DCA do not have standing
and grant summary judgment for the Appellant, Department
of Defense.
II. NEPA DOES NOT APPLY TO DEFENSE DEPART-
MENT ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES.
NEPA is essentially a procedural statute. Half Moon Bay
Fisherman Marketing v. Carlucci, 857 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir.
1988) quoting Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman,
817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987). As such, this court can set
aside the Army's decision not to prepare an EIS only if it was
undertaken without observing the statutory procedures or was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not
in accordance with the law." Id.
EF and DCA contend that Secretary of Defense's decision
that NEPA does not apply outside the United States is incor-
rect and that the Army must comply with the mandates of the
statute in its decision to apply Biocore at the Venice missile
site. However, this court cannot disturb the agency's decision
if that agency has taken a "hard look" at the decision's envi-
ronmental consequences. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 396,
(1976). From the facts, the Army has conducted laboratory ex-
periments on Biocore, and compared a complete "Summary of
Environmental Analysis of the Venice, Italy, Missile site
Clean-up." (R. 3) This 20-page document complies with Exec-
utive Order 12114, and summarizes the history of the Venice
missile site and the procedures used to detect and confirm the
presence of soil contamination, and its depth, the develop-
ment of Biocore, and compares the various possible proce-
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dures available to clean-up the missile site. It is clear from
these undisputed facts that the Army has indeed taken a
"hard look" at their decision and therefore this court should
not disturb that decision.
Further, the Supreme Court has spoken definitively on
the issue of an agencies interpretation of a'statute in Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837.
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
questions. First, always is the question whether congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Is the
intent of congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction in the statue, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpreta-
tion. rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-843.
A. The specific language of the statute indicates that
Congress did not intend for NEPA to apply outside
the U.S.
Under the general rules of statutory construction, if the
language of a statute is plain and the meaning is clear, courts
must give effect to it, regardless of what it thinks of its wis-
dom. Caninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). A
plain reading of NEPA shows a complete lack of congressional
intent to apply its provisions extraterritorially. The language
provides that federal government agencies shall:
declare a national policy. . .to enrich the understanding
of the ecological systems and natural resources important
to the nation. . .use all practicable means, consistent
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with other essential considerations of national policy
... that the Nation may... (3) assure for all Americans
safe. . .culturally pleasing surroundings... (4) preserve
important historic, cultural and natural aspect of our na-
tional heritage.
42 U.S.C. § 4331.
The lower court stated that the congressional declaration
of purpose, states that NEPA is to "promote efforts which will
prevent of eliminate damages to the environment and bio-
sphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man. Judge
Remus felt that "certainly the biosphere does not stop at the
border, and congress showed interest in protecting the health
of man as a species, whether in Italy or the United States."
(R. 7). What the lower court did not recognize was that these
words were simply boilerplate language that was not intended
to illustrate an intent to apply NEPA abroad. While congress
may have selected broad language to describe NEPA's pur-
pose, Congress failed to provide a clear expression of legisla-
tive intent through a plain statement of extraterritoriality.
Equal Employment Opportunity Council v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co., 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1234 (1991) (hereinafter Aramco).
Therefore, this court does not need to examine the legislative
history in order to devine Congressional intent. Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Massey, Civil Action No. 91- 1068
(D.D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 1991)
B. The legislative history of the statute indicates that
Congress did not intend for NEPA to apply outside
the U.S.
Assuming arguendo that the court would find it necessary
to peruse, there is nothing the legislative history of NEPA
that indicates Congress wished the statute to have extraterri-
torial application. Without evidence of a clear and affirmative
expression of Congressional intent, NEPA cannot overcome
the well established presumption against statutory extraterri-
toriality. The United States Congress can outline national
goals for Americans only. See 24 U.S.C. Section 4331(a) (1976)
("requirements of present and future generations of Ameri-
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cans"). NEPA thus reflects the perception of a global problem
from the American perspective, and offers a procedural rem-
edy to assist in a solution for Americans. Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 647 F.2d
1345, 1367 (1981). (hereinafter N.R.D.C. v. N.R.C.). Judge
Wilkey concluded that NEPA's legislative history illuminated
nothing in regard to extraterritorial application.
However, recently the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 3847 which would have clarified NEPA by requiring
"formal assessment in a manner that furthers the objective of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, of the signifi-
cant effects of its major actions, including extraterritorial ac-
tions, on the environment outside the jurisdiction of the
United States and its territories and possessions." 136 Cong.
Rec. H1170. This legislation did not pass the Senate and
NEPA stands as is, unamended as to extraterritorial applica-
tion. The fact that the House proposed the amendment is de-
terminative that Congress recognized NEPA previously did
not apply extraterritorially. Because the Senate failed to pass
the legislation, it is determinative that Congress does not in-
tend NEPA to apply abroad. The fact that this issue was
brought to the attention of the Congress and did not pass
should allow this court to determine without hesitation that
Congress had no intentions of allowing NEPA to apply
abroad.
C. The presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of NEPA has not been overcome.
Recently, the Supreme Court in Equal Employment Op-
portunity Council v. Arabian American Oil Co. 111 S.Ct. 1227
(1991) (hereinafter Aramco) concluded that legislation of con-
gress, unless contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at
1230 (quoting Foley Bros. Inc. supra at 285). This presump-
tion against extraterritoriality is "based on the assumption
that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic condi-
tions." Foley Bros at 285. Based on the foregoing discussions
of statutory language and legislative intent, this court cannot
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find sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
In Greenpeace USA v. Stone 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw.
1990), the District court refused to extend NEPA to actions
taken in a territory under the control of the United States.
The court's analysis did not rely upon the language of the
statute, but rather, upon the foreign policy aspect of NEPA's
possible extraterritorial application. The court stated that
"arguments for the extraterritorial application of NEPA were
outweighed by the "significant danger" of stopping specific ac-
tivity as well as the serious disruption to foreign policy which
might result." Id. at 754. The same is true in the case at bar.
If this Court would hold that NEPA would apply there could
be serious foreign policy implications.
Further, assuming arguendo that this court does specific
language in NEPA to apply extraterritorially, there is a seri-
ous separation of powers issues involved. It is the responsibil-
ity of the Executive to develop foreign policy. There is no evi-
dence showing that the Executive branch of government has
considered the foreign policy implications of applying NEPA
abroad. Without this clear evidence this court must overturn
the decision of the lower court and grant Appellant's motion
for summary judgment.
D. The district court's analogy between NEPA and the
Endangered Species Act was improper.
The lower court erred in comparing the language in the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) to the language and congres-
sional intent behind NEPA. The Honorable Judge Remus
found the 8th Circuits reasoning in Defenders of Wildlife v.
Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, (1990) persuasive when applied to the
text and legislative history of NEPA. (R. 7). This analogy was
improper given the clear intent of Congress and unambiguous
language of the ESA to apply outside the United States.
Under the Congressional findings and declaration of purposes
and policy in the ESA:
the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state
in the international communityto conserve... facing ex-
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tinction pursuant to . .. Canada and Mex-
ico... Japan... the Western Hemisphere ... Interna-
tional trade ... other international agreements ... and
programs which meet national and international stan-
dards ....
Endangered Species Act of 1973 Section 2(a)(4), as amended,
16 U.S.C. Section 1531(a)(4). [emphasis added].
The ESA also addresses foreign commerce and interna-
tional cooperation including financial assistance, encourage-
ment of foreign programs, and wildlife preservation in the
Western Hemisphere.
This language is very different from the language in Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act. The purposes of (NEPA)
are to declare an national policy. . .to enrich the understand-
ing of the ecological systems and natural resources important
to the nation. 42 U.S.C. Section 4321. NEPA also directs the
Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy . . .that
the Nation may. . . (3) assure for all Americans
safe. . .culturally pleasing surroundings. . . (4) preserve im-
portant historic, cultural and natural aspect of our national
heritage. 42 U.S.C. Section 4331. Further, Section 4332 states:
Congress authorizes..that to the fullest extent possible: (1) the
policies, regulations, and public law of the United States shall
be interpreted in accordance with this chapter. 42 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 4332.
In comparing the specific language of the two statutes,
Congress clearly intended ESA to apply extraterritorially,
while the constant references specifically to national policy
found in NEPA clearly indicate an intentof Congress that
NEPA should only apply in the United States and its territo-
ries. This court must find that NEPA does not apply to
agency actions abroad based upon vague references to a con-
cern with the biosphere and man's environment. Therefore
there is no need for the Army to prepare an EIS to support its
decision to use Biocore.
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III. THE ARMY'S COMPLIANCE WITH EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12114 IS PRECLUDED FROM JUDICIAL
REVIEW
In order to resolve the controversy over NEPA extraterri-
torial application and as part of his foreign policy, President
Carter initiated Executive Order 12114 to further environ-
mental objective consistent with the foreign policy and na-
tional security policy of the United States. Mandelker, NEPA
Law and Litigation Section 5:18 (1984). If a major Federal
action having effects on the environment of the United States
or the global commons requires preparation of an environ-
mental impact statement, and if the action also has effects on
the environment of a foreign nation, an environmental impact
statement need not be prepared with respect to the effect on
the environment of the foreign nation. Executive Order 12114
Section 3-5.
Executive Order 12114 is the exclusive law governing
evaluation of the environmental impacts of the clean-up pro-
cedure proposed for the Venice Missile Site. Executive Order
12114 provides, in part, as follows;
1-1 Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this Execu-
tive Order is to enable responsible officials of Federal
agencies having ultimate responsibility for authorizing
and approving actions encompassed by this Order to be
informed of pertinent environmental considerations and
to take such considerations into account, with other perti-
nent considerations of national policy, in making deci-
sions regarding such actions. While based on independent
authority, this Order furthers the purpose the National
Environmental Policy.
Executive Order 12114, Section 1-1.
This court cannot conclude that Executive Order 12114
preempts application of NEPA to all federal agency actions
taken outside the United States. Greenpeace at 762. Such an
application of an Executive Order would be inappropriate.
(See e.g. Independent Meat Packers Association v. Butz 526
F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975), cert denied, National Associa-
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tion of Meat Purveyors v. Butz, 424 U.S. 966 (1976). Never-
theless, this court must find under the specific facts of this
case that the Army's compliance with Executive Order 12114
is to given weight in determining whether NEPA applies.
The Order mandates an EIS only in situations where a
global commons is concerned. This clearly is not the case with
the missile site. Further, there will be no global commons in-
volved at all as was in the Greenpeace case. Therefore, this
court must rule that NEPA does not apply and no EIS should
be mandated.
IV. BECAUSE THE ARMY'S DECISION TO USE BI-
OCORE IS ONE THAT IS COMMITTED TO
AGENCY DISCRETION, THE DECISION IS NOT
REVIEWABLE
The Supreme Court has recently held that the rule in
Vermont Yankee applies to informal adjudication. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. _
(1990). Therefore, the courts are not permitted to require
agencies to provide hearing procedure when neither statute
nor due process requires hearings. This holding renders Inde-
pendent U.S. Tanker Owners Commission v. Lewis, 690 F.2d
908 (D.C. Cir. 1982) quite questionable. (Independent Tank-
ers held that an agency must provide some form of notice to
the parties and some opportunity for them to be informed of
and comment on the evidence before the agency and that the
agency must submit a reasoned explanation of its conclu-
sions). In LTV, a government agency required LTV to restore
its pension plan despite the bankruptcy laws, but provided no
opportunity for hearings. No statute required hearings, and
LTV did not argue that due process was violated. The Court
of Appeals held that prior notice and hearing and administra-
tive findings were required. The Supreme Court held that this
violated the rule in Vermont Yankee barring the courts from
requiring agencies to follow procedures beyond those provided
for in the APA. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
In Vermont Yankee the Court reasoned that if courts
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could impose additional procedures, the hearing requirements
would be so uncertain as to cause agencies to hold full trial-
type hearings in all cases, which would stultify the adminis-
trative process. Furthermore, in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 821 (1985), the Supreme Court re-
solved the conflict as to the reviewability of discretionary de-
cisions by construing APA section 701(a) quite narrowly. Re-
view of discretionary action will be precluded only in those
"rare instances" when there is no law to apply [ie. where the
statute provides no judicially manageable standards to detect
abuse Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)].
In Overton Park a statute provided that federal funds
should not be granted to construct highways through public
parks if there was a feasible and prudent alternative route.
The Secretary of Transportation nevertheless approved fund-
ing of such a highway, without stating a reason for doing so.
In LTV the court held that Vermont Yankee and Overton
Park, were not in conflict. The Overton Park decision is cor-
rect because an explanation is necessary for the court to re-
view the decision to see whether it is arbitrary and capricious.
In the present case the Secretary of Defense and the Army
has stated a reason for the decision to apply Biocore. The
Army's 20 page environmental summary described in detail
the reasons for applying Biocore, including sociological, envi-
ronmental and monetary reasons. Therefore the Army has
complied with the rule in Overton Park.
Further, several types of administrative decisions have
been held to lie entirely within the discretion of the agency,
and therefore are exempt from review. The Court has refused
to review an Army decision to call up a reservist, despite his
claim of extreme hardship on the basis that granting such re-
view would involve courts in military decision making and
open a "floodgate" of similar petitions. Unites States ex rel.
Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir.
1968). If this court allows the-decision- making function of the
Army to be undermined in this case, the possible suits
brought against the Army would be tremendous. Although
NEPA allows review in any instance, the court should take
into consideration the fact that this decision is within the De-
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partment of Defense's discretion and must be given great
deference.
B. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully re-
quests that the judgment of the district court be reversed and
Summary Judgment be entered in favor of the Appellant.
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